Abstract. Verification of trace equivalence is difficult to automate in general because it requires relating two infinite sets of traces. The problem becomes even more complex when algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives are taken in account in the formal model. For example, no verification tool or technique can currently handle automatically a realistic model of re-encryption or associative-commutative operators. In this setting, we propose a general technique for reducing the set of traces that have to be analyzed to a set of local traces. A local trace restricts the way in which some function symbols are used, and this allows us to perform a second reduction, by showing that some algebraic properties can be safely ignored in local traces. In particular, local traces for re-encryption will contain only a bounded number of re-encryptions for any given ciphertext, leading to a sound elimination of equations that model re-encryption. For associativity and commutativity, local traces will determine a canonical use of the associativecommutative operator, where reasoning modulo AC is no stronger than reasoning without AC. We illustrate these results by considering a non-disjoint combination of equational theories for the verification of vote privacy in Prêtà Voter. ProVerif can not handle the input theory as it is, but it does terminate with success on the theory obtained using our reduction result.
Introduction
Equivalence of formal processes, typically under the form of observational equivalence or trace equivalence, is fundamental in modeling security properties related to privacy. Some examples are strong secrecy [7] , resistance against guessing attacks [14] , authentication [3] , unlinkability and anonymity [4] , etc. Process equivalence can also be used to verify that a system implementation conforms to a given system specification [3] . Another example is ballot secrecy in electronic voting [20] , which is of particular relevance for this paper.
In order to not miss attacks, and sometimes even to be able to execute the protocols, the formal model has to take into account relevant algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives that are used [17] . The integration of algebraic properties in models and tools for automated verification of reachability properties, like secrecy, has been quite successful. However, only few results are known for verification of process equivalence. They are in general restricted to a bounded number of sessions and a basic Dolev-Yao theory [22, 29, 9, 10] , and do not go further than subterm-convergent theories [5, 15] , where the right-hand side of each equation is either a constant or a subterm of the left-hand side. ProVerif can handle an unbounded number of sessions and a broad class of equational theories [8] , but may not terminate and may discover false attacks. None of the above-mentioned techniques can handle associative-commutative properties, like those of XOR, abelian groups, Diffie-Hellman, etc.
The starting point of our work is a case study that can not be handled by ProVerif, namely analysis of vote privacy in Prêtà Voter (PaV) [28] . Privacy in many electronic voting systems, not only in PaV, is based on a re-encryption mixnet, whose role is to break the link between ballots that are cast and ballots that are decrypted. A realistic model for such protocols has to contain not only equations that model re-encryption, but also at least equations for the associative-commutative properties of the underlying group and for the zeroknowledge proofs output by the mixnet. However, ProVerif does not terminate for PaV even when only the single re-encryption equation renc(enc(x, y, z), z ) = enc(x, y, f (z, z )) is considered along with the standard Dolev-Yao theory for public-key encryption.
Our contributions. We show how, in general, trace equivalence modulo a nondisjoint combination E ∪ E renc ∪ AC, can be reduced to trace equivalence modulo E -a slightly augmented version of E. If E is subterm-convergent, then E is subterm-convergent as well. In particular, ProVerif terminates with success for E PaV -the result of applying our reduction to the combination of theories suggested above. The main idea in the construction of E is to anticipate in advance the maximal number of re-encryptions that are necessary to apply for any given ciphertext. We only prove the soundness of the given reduction in this paper. This means that our reduction may fail to prove that some processes are equivalent, but the value of the proposed approach is shown by our ability to carry an automated proof of privacy for PaV. This is a first automated proof of trace equivalence for protocols relying on re-encryption and AC symbols.
Related work. The idea of bounding the number of application of rewrite rules is similar to the finite variant property [13] and has already been helpful to make ProVerif work modulo XOR [25] . Less like [13] , and more like [25] , our bound is not intrinsic to the theory, but comes from a restriction on the class of protocols. Another similarity with [25] is in our way of removing AC, but we will show that there is a fundamental difference when one considers equivalence properties. The reduction of [25] , and also the one for Diffie-Hellman in [24] , have also been proven to be complete. On the other hand, these reductions are restricted to reachability properties, and do not cover equivalence properties. Furthermore, they consider a representation of protocols in terms of Horn clauses, which limits the aplicability of their results to ProVerif (or other tools based on Horn clauses) and is less general than the applied pi-calculus [2] , that we use. [27, 26] also consider abstractions of Diffie-Hellman and show that they are sound for reachability properties. Diffie-Hellman has some similarities with re-encryption, but the interaction of re-encryption with encryption is making it significantly different.
If results for process equivalence are limited to subterm-convergent theories [22, 29, 9, 10, 5, 15] , results for static equivalence go further than that. [1] shows decidability in presence of blind signatures and homomorphic encryption (without AC), and there is also a tool available [6] . Furthermore, the theory and implementation of [11] cover also trapdoor bit-commitment and malleable encryption. Malleable encryption is similar to re-encryption, but it is not associativecommutative: the value of the random can be changed, but it does not depend on its previous value. There are also results showing that algorithms for static equivalence can be combined for disjoint theories [16] , and that a function symbol can be eliminated from the theory if it respects a hierarchy of sorts [23] . Our theory is a non-disjoint combination of encryption, re-encryption and other cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, [23] can not be applied to separate re-encryption from encryption, because a strict hierarchy of sorts can not be established due to the presence of the equation renc(enc(x, y, z), z ) = enc(x, y, f (z, z )).
Preliminaries
1.1 Terms and equational theories. We start with an infinite set of constants N , called names, and an infinite set of variables X . Given a finite signature F, N ⊆ N and X ⊆ X , we denote by T (F, N , X ) the set of terms obtained by recursively applying symbols from F to elements from N ∪ X . Terms will be denoted by u, v, s, t, . . ., variables by x, y, z, . . ., and names by n, m, r, . . . We let F 0 be the set of constants in F.
For a term t, we will denote by var(t) the set of its variables, by st(t) the set of its subterms and by sig(t) the set of function symbols that occur in t. We say that a term is ground if var(t) = ∅. A term context C[ ] is a term that has a special symbol , called hole, in place of a subterm. The application of C[ ] to a term t is the term C[t], i.e. the result of replacing the hole with t.
Given three terms t, u, v, we denote by t{u → v} the term obtained from t by replacing every occurence of u with v. A replacement ρ is a partial function from terms to terms: if ρ = {u 1 → v 1 , . . . , u n → v n }, we have dom(ρ) = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and ran(ρ) = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. We assume that u 1 , . . . , u n are ordered such that u i ∈ st(u j ) =⇒ j < i. Then, for any term t, the application of ρ to t is
A substitution σ is a replacement with dom(σ) ⊆ X . Substitutions will be denoted by σ, θ, τ . . ., whereas replacements will be denoted by (annotations of) ρ. The composition of two substitutions σ and θ is a substitution σ • θ defined by the set {x → (xσ)θ | x ∈ dom(σ)} ∪ {x → xθ | x ∈ dom(θ) dom(σ)}. Given a substitution σ, if the composition σ • . . . • σ has a finite least fix point we denote it by σ * , i.e. we have σ * = σ • . . .
• σ and σ * • σ = σ * . Note that, if the variables in dom(σ) can be ordered as x 1 , . . . , x n such that i < j =⇒ x j / ∈ var(x i σ), then σ * exists. The restriction of a substitution σ to a set V ⊆ dom(σ) is denoted by σ| V .
An equational theory is given by a pair E = (R, AC S ), where AC S is a set of equations modeling the associativity and commutativity of symbols in S ⊆ F and R is a rewrite system convergent modulo AC S . The rules of R are written as l → r, with l, r ∈ T (F, X ) and var(r) ⊆ var(l). Given a rewrite system R, there is a rewriting step (resp. rewriting step modulo AC S ) from u to v if u = C[w], w = lσ (resp. w = AC S lσ) and v = C[rσ], for some context C, rewrite rule l → r ∈ R and substitution σ. The term w is called a redex. The normal form of a term t with respect to R (resp. modulo AC S ) will be denoted by t↓ (resp. t↓ AC ), or by t↓ R (resp. t↓ R,AC ) when R is not clear from the context. Then, we have by definition u = E v if and only if u↓ R,AC = AC v↓ R,AC . The existence of a rewriting step (resp. modulo AC) from u to v will be denoted by u → v (resp. u → AC v). Relying on the convergence of R, we can restrict ourselves to bottomup rewriting steps, i.e. all the strict subterms of a redex are in normal form. For two terms u, v, we write u = v to denote their syntactic equality, u = E v to denote their equality modulo E, and u = AC v to denote their equality modulo AC S .
An equational theory (R, ∅) is subterm-convergent if for every rule l → r ∈ R, we have r ∈ st(l) ∪ F 0 . To avoid confusion, when the equational theory is not clear from the context, we annotate all our symbols by the theory to which they refer to. Example 1. The classical Dolev-Yao theory for public-key encryption is modeled by the signature F DY = {enc, dec, pub, , , π 1 , π 2 } and the subterm-convergent equational theory E DY = (R DY , ∅), where
The re-encryption property of public-key encryption schemes like El-Gamal can be modeled by the signature F renc = {enc, renc, f } and the equational theory E renc = (R renc , AC f ), where A, B := 0 plain processes P, Q := processes
A name n that occurs in a process P is bound if it occurs under a νn, otherwise it is free. A variable x that occurs in P is bound if it occurs under a νx or under a c(x), otherwise it is free. We will denote by bn(P ), bv(P ), bv(P ), resp. fv(P ) the bound names (including channel names), free names, bound variables and resp. free variables of P . By α-conversion of bound names and variables we will always assume that bn(P ) ∩ fn(P ) = ∅, bv(P ) ∩ fv(P ) = ∅, and there are no two distinct binders for the same name or the same variable. We denote by P α the process obtained by substituting every bound name and variable in P with a fresh one. A process P is closed if any variable in P is either bound or occurs in a subprocess of the form {x → u}. A process context C[ ] is a process that has a special symbol , called hole, in the place of a sub-process. The application of C[ ] to a process P is C[P ], i.e. the result of replacing the hole with P . An evaluation context is a process context whose hole is not in the scope of a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output. We let sp(P ) = {Q | ∃C[ ]. P = C[Q]} be the set of sub-processes, st(P ) be the set of terms (and their subterms) and sig(P ) = sig(st(P )) be the set of function symbols that occur in P .
Structural equivalence is the smallest equivalence relation ≡ on processes that is closed under the application of evaluation contexts and the application of the following equations:
A frame φ is a (static) process of the form νñ.νx.σ, whereñ is a sequence of names in N ,x is a sequence of variables and σ is a substitution such that σ * exists. We have bn(φ) =ñ and dom(φ) = dom(σ) x. The set of recipes for φ is defined as (φ) = T (F, N bn(φ), dom(φ)). Recipes will sometimes be denoted by ζ, χ, . . . For a term u (in particular, u can be a recipe), we define the application of the frame φ = νñ.νx.σ to u as the application of σ * to u, i.e. we let u[φ] = uσ * . For a frame φ = νñ.νx.σ and a substitution θ, we let
For a process P , we let fr(P ) be the frame associated to P , defined as fr(P ) = νñ.νx.σ, whereñ = bn(P ) ∩ N ,x = bv(P ) and σ is the substitution obtained by the union of all the sub-processes of P of the form {x → u}. Our transition relation will ensure that all variable x has a single occurence as {x → u} in P , thus σ is well-defined. Furthermore, for all processes P , it will be the case that the variables in dom(σ) can be ordered as x 1 , . . . , x n such that i < j =⇒ x j / ∈ var(x i σ). Therefore, σ * always exists and fr(P ) is indeed a frame. Labeled reduction is a relation between closed processes defined by the following rules, modulo structural equivalence: for any evaluation context
The semantics is very similar to the one in [2] , with superficial differences that help in our proofs. The most notable difference is that we never apply the frame to the process, but only use the frame where it makes a difference, i.e. in tests.
Similarly, equational reasoning is not part of structural equivalence, but is only used in tests. A trace is a sequence of labeled reductions
We will denote such a trace by P 1 w − → P n , where w = α 1 . . . α n . We let obs(w) be the sequence of labels obtained by erasing all occurence of τ in w.
Example 2. Consider the theory E = E DY ∪ E renc from Example 1, and
We have P νz1.c z1
and
Furthermore, P 0 νz3.c z3
Trace equivalence and secrecy.
Definition 1 (static equivalence). We say that two frames φ, ψ are in static equivalence modulo an equational theory E, denoted by φ
When E is not clear from the context, we use the notation φ s ∼ E ψ. We say that two traces P Definition 2 (trace equivalence). We say that two plain processes P, Q are in trace equivalence, denoted by P ∼ Q, if for every trace P w1 − − → P , there exists a trace Q w2 − − → Q such that obs(w 1 ) = obs(w 2 ) and fr(P ) s ∼ fr(Q ). Moreover, each trace of Q must have a corresponding statically equivalent trace of P . Example 3. Continuing example 2, let us consider the process Q = P {a → b} and let P w1 − − → P 1 be the exhibited trace. Then, we have P ∼ Q, because
, and thus fr(P 1 )
Definition 3 (intruder knowledge and secrecy). Let E be an equational theory. For a frame φ, we let I(φ, E) = {u | ∃ζ ∈ (φ). ζ[φ] = E u}. For all processes P , we let I(P, E) = {u | ∃Q, w. P w − → Q & u ∈ I(fr(Q), E)} and S(P, E) = bn(P ) I(P, E).
Starting point: the case study
In this paper and in the corresponding ProVerif code, we only perform the analysis of PaV for the case of two eligible voters idA, idB and two candidates a, b. This is mainly for simplicity of presentation, but also because we believe that a result like the one in [12] could be translated to privacy properties.
In addition to El-Gamal encryption and re-encryption, modeled by E DY and E renc from example 1, PaV relies on zero-knowledge proofs to provide universal verifiability of the election result. We have to model these proofs in our analysis, to ensure that we do not miss any attacks on privacy that may be made possible by the additional information that is published. In particular, PaV relies on mixnet proofs and on proofs of correct decryption, that we model by the signature F ver = {mixPf/6, checkMix/5, decPf/3, checkDec/4, ok/0} and the equational theories E decP = (R decP , ∅), E mixP = (R mixP , ∅), where:
The main idea of PaV is that an election authority A creates ballots that contain the names of the candidates in a random order on the left-hand side and their corresponding encryption in the same order on the right-hand side. This allows the voter to mark a vote for the desired candidate and scan only the encrypted part of the ballot, the right-hand side, to be posted on the bulletin board. Because the random order of candidates in the ballot and the decryption key are assumed to be secret, this ensures vote privacy, and even coercionresistance, if care is taken to destroy the left-hand side. We use the following equational theory to model the actions of the voter during voting: F vote = {vote, , } and E vote = {R vote , ∅}, where R vote = {vote( x, y , x e , y e ), x) → x e , vote( x, y , x e , y e ), y) → y e }.
After the encrypted votes get to the bulletin board, the design of PaV is similar to other voting systems like JCJ/Civitas or Helios: ballots are anonymized by a re-encryption mixnet and decrypted by the holders of the secret key. Putting it all together, the equational theory and the process that model PaV are given by E PaV and P PaV in figure 1 . V is the process for a voter, A is the process for the election authority that constructs the ballots, B is the process for the public bulletin board, M is the process for a mix server and T is the process for a trustee holding the decryption key.
In process M, we have {i, j} = {1, 2} and mixProof = mixPf(x 1 , x 2 , renc(π i (x ballots ), n 1 ), renc(π j (x ballots ), n 2 ), n 1 , n 2 ). In process T, we have decP i = decPf(π i (x ballots ), dec(π i (x ballots ), sk), sk), for all i ∈ {1, 2}. The channel c printer is auth .(c auth a, b | c auth b, a | c auth (xcan) .νr1.νr2.
c printer xcan, enc(π1(xcan), pub(sk), r1), enc(π2(xcan), pub(sk), r2) V(id, v) = c printer (x ballot ).cscanner id, vote(x ballot , v) .cver id, vote(x ballot , v) B = cscanner(ballot1).cscanner(ballot2).c mix ballot1, ballot2 M = cver(y).cver(z).c mix (x ballots ).if π1(y), π1(z), π2(y), π2(z) = idA, idB, x ballots then νn1.νn2.ctrustee renc(πi(x ballots ), n1), renc(πj(x ballots ), n2) . c board renc(πi(x ballots ), n1), renc(πj(x ballots ), n2), mixProof T = c board pub(sk) .ctrustee(x ballots ).c board π1(x ballots ), dec(π1(x ballots ), sk), decP1 .
c board π2(x ballots ), dec(π2(x ballots ), sk), decP2 where V gets the ballots -it is private because the order of candidates should be kept secret. c ver is a private channel whose role is to enforce eligibility: exactly the ballots of idA and idB go into the mix. Without this, the intruder could mount an attack against the privacy of idA by replacing the ballot of idB with a copy of the ballot of idA in one of the public channels c scanner or c mix , as in e.g. [19] . The channel c trustee has to be private to ensure that the ballots that are decrypted are indeed the ones that are mixed, and are not supplied by the intruder. Note that the channels c scanner , c board and c mix are public, and all information that goes on private channels is also published on c board .
To verify that P PaV satisfies vote-privacy we check that P PaV {v 1 → a}{v 2 → b} ∼ E PaV P PaV {v 1 → b}{v 2 → a} [20] . The motivation of our work is that, when given as input this task (even without AC f , E mixP and E decP ), ProVerif does not terminate. The non-termination is certainly due to E renc , because E DY ∪ E decP ∪ E mixP ∪ E vote is a subterm-convergent theory and is easily handled by ProVerif.
General setting for the reduction
For a term t and process P , we let: re(t) = {u ∈ st(t) | top(u) ∈ {enc, renc}}; re(P ) = {u ∈ st(P ) | top(u) ∈ {enc, renc}} ran(t) = v, if t = enc(t 1 , t 2 , v) ∨ t = renc(t 1 , v); ran(P ) = {ran(u) | u ∈ re(P )} Assumptions about the equational theory. In general, we consider a signature F such that {enc, renc, f } ⊆ F and a class of equational theories InpTh such that for all E ∈ InpTh, we have E = E ∪ E renc , for some equational theory E = (R , ∅). We assume furthermore that for each rule l → r ∈ R : (ae 1 ) top(l) / ∈ {enc, renc} and f / ∈ sig(l) (ae 2 ) sig(r) ∩ {renc, enc, f } = ∅ (ae 3 ) for all t, t ∈ re(l), we have:
· ran(t) ∈ var(l) var(r) · ran(t) = ran(t ) =⇒ t = t It is easy to see that E PaV satisfies (ae 1 )-(ae 3 ).
Assumptions about the class of processes. We define the weak symbols of E = (R, AC f ) by W(E) = {g ∈ F | l → r ∈ R & g ∈ sig(l) =⇒ r ∈ F 0 }. For example, we have W(E PaV ) = F ver ∪ {f }. For all term u, we define:
)} Intuitively, st p (t) are the subterms of t whose every occurence is "protected" by a weak symbol or by {enc, renc}. For example, st p ( a, c, renc(b, c), renc(b, d) ) = {d}. We assume the following properties about every process P that we consider:
The main goal of assumptions (ap 2 ),(ap 3 ) is to ensure that the elements of ran(P ) are kept secret by the process. It is easy to see that P PaV satisfies (ap 1 )-(ap 4 ).
The reduced theory. Given an input theory
renc be the inverse of R renc , that is:
renc is convergent modulo AC. Given a term t, we let var f (t) = {s ∈ var(t) | enc(u, v, s) ∈ st(t) ∨ renc(u, s) ∈ st(t)}. Then, for all m ≥ 1, an (f, m)-substitution for t is a substitution σ such that dom(σ) ⊆ var f (t) and
. We denote by Θ f,m (t) the set of (f, m)-substitutions for t. Now, we consider a particular case of narrowing [21] with respect to R −1 renc to define a set of variants [13] of a term: enc(a, b, x 0 ), x 1 ), x 2 )} and V renc 2 (renc(a, x)) = {renc(a, x), renc(renc(a, x 0 ), x 1 ), renc(renc(renc(a, x 0 ), x 1 ), x 2 )} Finally, we can define the reduced theory that corresponds to E and m:
OutTh be the set of all reduced theories that correspond to some E ∈ InpTh and some m ≥ 1.
Example 5. Let us consider the theory E PaV and m = 1. We have E PaV,m = (E PaV E renc ) ∪ (S, ∅), where
, renc(y, z y )) → ok plus rules for checkMix corresponding to other permutations and to substitutions {z y → f (z For all E = E ∪ E renc ∈ InpTh such that E is subterm-convergent, E m is subterm-convergent.
We let ran r (P ) = {t | renc(u, t) ∈ st(P )}. Our main result is a reduction of trace equivalence modulo any E ∈ InpTh to trace equivalence modulo E m ∈ OutTh, for a well-chosen m:
Theorem 1 (Main theorem). For all processes P, Q that satisfy (ap 1 )-(ap 4 ) let m = 2 * max(|ran r (P )|, |ran r (Q)|) + 1. Then, for all equational theory E ∈ InpTh, we have
where E m ∈ OutTh is the reduced theory that corresponds to E and m.
Reduction of the set of traces
As a first step in the proof of theorem 1, we introduce a restricted notion of trace equivalence, P Q, that depends only on so-called local traces of P and Q. We show that P ∼ Em Q =⇒ P Em Q and P E Q =⇒ P ∼ E Q.
Occurence order for a frame.
In the following, we assume that for all frame φ we are given a partial order ≺ on variables in var(φ). For all P, Q such that P w − → Q, we associate such an order ≺ to fr(Q): for all x, y ∈ var(fr(Q)) we have x ≺ y iff w = w 1 w 2 and there is a P 1 such that P w1 − − → P 1 w2 − − → Q, x ∈ var(φ(P 1 )) and y / ∈ var(fr(P 1 )). We let x y if x ≺ y ∨ x = y. The orders ≺ and are extended to sets of variables from var(φ) by: S 1 S 2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ S 1 ∃y ∈ S 2 .x y and S 1 ≺ S 2 ⇔ S 1 S 2 & ∃y ∈ S 2 ∀x ∈ S 1 .x ≺ y. Finally, we extend ≺ (and ) to a preorder on terms in T (F, N , var(φ)) by letting u ≺ v ⇔ var(u) ≺ var(v) (and u v ⇔ var(u) var(v)). 
For the trace P w − → P 1 of example 2, we have
Local traces in general
The definitions and results from this section stand for any equational theory E, with no restriction on E and no restriction on the class of processes.
In the following, we consider given a locality function L, that associates to each frame φ a subset of its recipes, i.e. L(φ) ⊆ (φ).
Definition 4 (local static equivalence). Let L be a locality function. We say that two frames φ, ψ are in L-local static equivalence, denoted by φ s ψ, if
When L or E is not clear from the context, we use the notation φ s L,E ψ. We say that two traces P w1 − − → P and Q w2 − − → Q are in L-local static equivalence if obs(w 1 ) = obs(w 2 ) and fr(P ) s L fr(Q ). For a sequence of labels w, we let inp(w) be the set of recipes that occur as inputs in w, i.e. inp(w) = {ζ | ∃w 1 , w 2 , c. w
Definition 5 (local trace equivalence). Let L be a locality function. We say that two processes P, Q are in L-local trace equivalence, denoted by P Q, if for all L-local trace P When L is not clear from the context, we use the notation P L,E Q. The idea of L-locality is to restrict the set of traces that have to be considered. A locality function is especially useful if it admits a normalization function that assigns to each recipe an equivalent local recipe:
We denote by norm L1,L2 (φ) the set of normalization functions from L 1 to L 2 for φ. When L 1 = , we may use the notation norm L2 (φ) for this set.
We say that a frame φ is issued from a (L-local) trace if there is a process P and a (L-local) trace P w − → P such that φ = fr(P ). The following two propositions show under which conditions trace equivalence and local trace equivalence coincide. Proposition 1. Let L be a locality function such that, for all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two statically equivalent traces, we have L(φ) = L(ψ). Then, for all plain processes P, Q, we have P ∼ Q =⇒ P L Q. Proposition 2. Let L be a locality function such that, for all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two L-statically equivalent and L-local traces, there exists a normalization function N ∈ norm L (φ) ∩ norm L (ψ). Then, for all processes P, Q, we have P L Q =⇒ P ∼ Q.
To ease the construction of a normalization function for a locality function L 2 , we can introduce an intermediary locality function L 1 , with
, and provide two normalization functions: one from to L 1 , and one from L 1 to L 2 . This is the role of the following corollary:
-for all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two L 2 -statically equivalent and L 2 -local traces, there exists a normalization function N 2 ∈ norm L1,L2 (φ) ∩ norm L1,L2 (ψ).
-for all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two L 1 -statically equivalent and L 1 -local traces, there exists a normalization function N 1 ∈ norm ,L1 (φ) ∩ norm ,L1 (ψ). -for all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two statically equivalent traces, we have
Then, for all processes P, Q, we have P L2 Q =⇒ P L1 Q =⇒ P ∼ Q
Local traces for re-encryption
We define a locality function L renc that will allow us to infer a bound on the number of re-encryptions applied to any given ciphertext. The main idea of L renc is to disalow nested applications of the function renc in recipes. In spite of this strong restriction, L renc will admit a normalization function, because nested applications of renc can be replaced with equivalent terms that are somehow smaller, e.g. renc(π 1 ( renc(ζ 1 , ζ 2 ), χ , ζ 3 ) can be replaced with renc(ζ 1 , f (ζ 2 , ζ 3 )). Let φ be a frame and ≺ be an occurence order on recipes associated to φ. For two recipes ζ 1 , ζ 2 ∈ (φ), we define
Intuitively, we have ζ 1 ζ 2 if ζ 2 is a re-encryption of ζ 1 . The role of the intermediary recipe χ 1 in the definition of is to take into account the case where ζ 2 is not a direct re-encryption of ζ 1 , but there exists a context inbetween ζ 2 and ζ 1 that may dissapear by rewriting. This context may be entirely contained in χ 1 , and then we have ζ 1 ∈ st(χ 1 ), or it may descent into the substitution part of χ 1 [φ], and then we have ζ 1 ≺ χ 1 (note that we require ≺, and not simply ).
Example 7. Let us consider the trace P w − → P 1 of example 2. Let φ = fr(P 1 ) and ≺ be the corresponding occurence order. Then, we have renc(
Now, given a frame φ, we can define the sets of recipes RR(φ) and respectively RE(φ) that represent a nested application of re-encryptions and respectively the re-encryption of an encryption. Local traces will avoid the use of such recipes. Formally, we have:
renc(π 2 (z 2 ), n 2 ) and top(renc(z 1 , n 1 )) = renc.
Lemma 2. For all equational theory E and all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two statically equivalent traces, we have L renc (φ) = L renc (ψ).
Lemma 3 (Normalization function N renc ). Consider the locality function L renc and an equational theory E ∈ InpTh. For all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two L renc -statically equivalent and L renc -local traces, there exists a normalization function N renc ⊆ norm Lrenc (φ) ∩ norm Lrenc (ψ).
We prove lemma 3 by replacing every recipe renc(ζ 0 , χ 0 ) ∈ st(ζ) ∩ (RR(φ) ∪ RR(ψ)), such that renc(ζ 1 , χ 1 ) renc(ζ 0 , χ 0 ), with renc(ζ 1 , f (χ 0 , χ 1 )). We rely on φ s ψ and on a well-chosen ordering of replacements to ensure that their application is consistent in both frames. None of assumptions (ae 1 )-(ae 3 ) or (ap 1 )-(ap 4 ) are used in the proof.
Local traces for associativity-commutativity
We define a locality function L f that will ensure a canonical use of the AC symbol f : the nested application of f -symbols always follows the same pattern and arguments of f always respect a well-chosen order. We consider multi-hole term contexts: C[ , . . . , ] n is a context with n holes, and the subscript n will be dropped when n is clear from the context. For all n ≥ 1, we let C n f be the n-hole context f (. . . f (f ( , ), ) . . . , ).
Definition 8. Assume that t is a term such that t = C[t 1 , . . . , t n ], with sig(C) = {f } and top(t 1 ) = f, . . . , top(t n ) = f . Then, we define Fact f (t) = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and C f (t) = C[ , . . . , ]. Sometimes we use the notation Fact f (t) to also denote the set {t 1 , . . . , t n }.
Let φ be a frame and ≺ be the associated occurence ordering. We consider any total extension of ≺, denoted by ≺ f , that is compatible with the subterm ordering, i.e. u ∈ st(v) {v} =⇒ u ≺ f v. For all ζ ∈ (φ), we define min φ f (ζ) to be the minimal wrt ≺ f recipe that is equivalent to ζ in φ, i.e. we have min
Now, given a frame φ, we can define the set of terms GF(φ) that will determine the restricted use of the symbol f :
Intuitively, GF(φ) requires that its members are in canonical form wrt associativity of f , via C f (t) = C n f , and in canonical form wrt commutativity of f , via min
Recall that, for all term u, u↓ represents the normalization of u wrt to R only, not considering AC f :
Definition 9 (Locality function L f ). For all frame φ, we let
One may wonder why, in the definition of GF(φ), we compare the minimal recipes min φ f (ζ i ) and not simply the terms t i , like in [25] , or the recipes ζ i . We do not compare the terms t i , because they may contain information that is irrelevant to observations that can be made in a frame, in particular they may contain secret names. We want to abstract away from such details, especially since we want to relate two frames that may well be distinct on their non-observable parts. Furthermore, we do not compare the recipes ζ i because that would not be sufficient to eliminate AC properties in a L f -local trace: we may have
On the other hand, comparing min φ f (ζ i ) ensures an ordering on equivalence classes, and not merely an ordering on recipes.
Example 10. Consider the frames φ = νa.νb.
In example 9, if we assume n 2 ≺ f n 1 , the recipe renc(
Definition 10 (Locality function L rf ). For all frame φ, we let
The following lemma is crucial in defining a normalization function for L f , because it will allow us to obtain recipes of terms in Fact f (ζ[φ]↓), that we can re-arrange to transform a non-local recipe into a local one: Lemma 4. Let P, Q be processes such that P w − → Q and let φ = fr(Q). Then, for all recipe ζ ∈ (φ) such that
The proof of lemma 4 relies on assumptions (ae 2 ),(ae 3 ) and (ap 1 ) to deduce that, whenever f (t 1 , t 2 ) is deducible in a trace, it must be the case that both t 1 and t 2 are deducible.
Lemma 5. For all equational theory E = (R, ∅) ∈ OutTh and all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two statically equivalent traces, we have
The proof of lemma 5 is eased by the absence of AC symbols, and it relies on lemma 4 and φ s ∼ ψ to transfer the L f -locality of a recipe from φ to ψ. N f ) . Consider the locality functions L renc , L rf and an equational theory E ∈ InpTh. For all frames φ, ψ that are issued from two L rf -statically equivalent and L rf -local traces, there exists a normalization function
Lemma 6 (Normalization function
We prove lemma 6 by replacing all ζ ∈ st(ζ) such that ζ [φ]↓ / ∈ GF(φ) and Fact f (ζ [φ]↓) = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) with an equivalent ζ such that ζ [φ]↓ ∈ GF(φ), to obtain an L f -local recipe. To construct ζ , we start with a sequence of recipes ζ 1 , . . . , ζ n such that ζ 1 [φ]↓ = t 1 , . . . , ζ n [φ]↓ = t n , whose existence is ensured by lemma 4. Then, we consider ζ = C n f [ζ i1 , . . . , ζ in ], where ζ i1 , . . . , ζ in is a reordering of ζ 1 , . . . , ζ n such that min
We rely on φ s ψ to ensure that these replacements are consistent in both frames φ and ψ.
Example 11. Continuing example 10, we have
Main results of this section
From proposition 1, lemma 2 and lemma 5, we have
Consider the locality function L rf and any equational theory E m ∈ OutTh. Then, for all plain processes P, Q, we have P ∼ Q =⇒ P L rf Q.
From corollary 1 (applied to L renc and L rf ) and lemmas 6, 3 and 2, we have:
Consider the locality function L rf and any equational theory E ∈ InpTh. Then, for all plain processes P, Q, we have P L rf Q =⇒ P ∼ Q.
To bridge the gap between P ∼ Em Q and P ∼ E Q it is sufficient now to show that P L rf ,Em Q =⇒ P L rf ,E Q. This is the subject of the next section.
Reduction of equational theories
In this section, we use R for a rewrite system corresponding to a theory in InpTh, and R m for a corresponding rewrite system of a theory in OutTh. Lemma 7 simplifies reasoning modulo AC, by showing that AC f does not interfere with rewriting. The proof relies on assumption (ae 1 ), in particular on the fact that f does not occur on the left-hand side of rewrite rules: Lemma 7. For any equational theory E ∈ InpTh and for all terms u, v, we have u → * AC v if and only if u → * v , for some term v such that v = AC v.
Lemma 8 simplifies reasoning modulo re-encryption, by showing that nonces from the protocol always stay secret:
Lemma 8. For all process P that satisfies (ap 1 )-(ap 4 ) and all equational theory E that satisfies (ae 1 )-(ae 3 ), we have ran(P ) ⊆ S(P, E).
The proof relies on assumptions (ap 2 ) and (ap 3 ), to ensure that elements of ran(P ) are handled in a restricted way. Then, assumption (ae 3 ) and the definitions of st p , W(E) ensure that this indeed guarantees secrecy.
We will show that L rf -local traces have a bounded re-encryption depth. To define it, we must identify the chain of re-encryptions that have been applied to obtain a given ciphertext. This chain will be the limit of recursively identifying re-encryption witnesses:
Definition 11 (Re-encryption witness). Assume u → * R v. Then, for all term t ∈ st(v) with top(t↓) ∈ {enc, renc}, a re-encryption witness for t in u is a term rw u (t) ∈ st(u), such that rw u (t) → * R t↓ and top(rw u (t)) ∈ {enc, renc}. enc(a, b, r 1 ), c ), r 2 ), c ). We have u → v 1 → * v 2 where v 1 = π 1 ( renc(enc(a, b, r 1 ), r 2 ), c ) and v 2 = enc(a, b, f (r 1 , r 2 )). Then, for t = enc(a, b, r 1 ) ∈ st(v 1 ), we have rw u (t) = t. For t = enc(a, b, f (r 1 , r 2 )) ∈ st(v 2 ), we have rw v1 (t) = renc(enc(a, b, r 1 ), r 2 ) and rw u (t) = renc(π 1 ( enc(a, b, r 1 ), c ), r 2 ).
Lemma 9. Assume u → * R v. Then, for all term t ∈ st(v) with top(t↓) ∈ {enc, renc}, there always exists a re-encryption witness rw u (t).
In particular, the previous lemma shows that for all term t with top(t↓) ∈ {enc, renc} there exists a re-encryption witness of t↓ in t, that is rw t (t↓).
Definition 12 (Re-encryption depth). For all term t, we define its re-encryption depth rd(t) as follows:
-rd(t) = 0, if top(t↓ R ) / ∈ {enc, renc} -rd(t) = 1, if top(t↓ R ) = enc and top(rw t (t↓)) = enc -rd(t) = rd(t ) + 1, if top(t↓ R ) ∈ {enc, renc} and rw t (t↓) = renc(t , t ) Example 13. We have rd(renc(π 1 ( renc(enc(a, b, r 1 ), r 2 ), renc(a, r 0 ) , r 3 )) = 3. Continuing example 12, we have rd(u) = 2.
Next we show that for all term u with a re-encryption depth bounded by m, its normal form modulo R m is the normal form modulo R m of its re-encryption witness modulo R:
Lemma 10. Let u be a term such that, for all t ∈ st(u), rd(t) ≤ m + 1. Then, for all term v such that u → * R v following a bottom-up rewriting sequence, we have u → * Rm vρ where ρ = {t → rw u (t)↓ Rm | t ∈ st(v) & top(t) ∈ {enc, renc} & t = t↓ R } Example 14. Consider the terms u = renc(π 1 enc(a, pub(k), r 1 ), a , r 2 ) and u 1 = dec(u, k). Then, rw u (u↓ R ) = u, and we obviously have u↓ Rm = (u↓ R )ρ = rw u (u↓ R )↓ Rm = renc(enc(a, pub(k), r 1 ), r 2 ). On the other hand, we have u 1 → Rm dec(u↓ Rm , k) → Rm a = u 1 ↓ R = u 1 ↓ R ρ, where we have used the rule dec(renc(enc(x, pub(y), z 0 ), z 1 ), y) → x for the last rewriting step.
